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China’s banking sector has been largely transformed over the past 
decade. Several of the largest banks have been restructured, recapi-
talized, and listed. Governance has improved, notably through 
the appointment of independent members to boards of directors. 
A  vigorous  new  regulatory  and  supervisory  agency,  the  China 
Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC), has introduced new 
accounting standards, a revised risk weighting system for measur-
ing capital, more rigorous loan loss criteria, heightened provision-
ing requirements, and other significant changes. Foreign banks 
have entered the market, both through their own branches and 
subsidiaries and through strategic investments in domestic banks, 
bringing better banking practices and much needed additional 
competition. 
And  by  most  metrics,  financial  performance  of  Chinese 
banks has improved. Nonperforming loans of major commercial 
banks fell from 17.9 percent of loans outstanding in 2003 to 
only 6.7 percent in 2007.1 The share of banking assets accounted 
for by banks meeting the statutory capital adequacy requirement 
rose from 0.6 to 79 percent over the same period. By 2007 the 
return on assets and return on equity for the banking sector as 
a whole rose to a relatively respectable 0.9 and 16.7 percent, 
respectively.2
In one critical respect, however, the financial system appears 
to  have  retrogressed.  The  central  bank,  the  People’s  Bank  of 
China (PBC), controls interest rates in a way that has led to 
significant financial repression as inflation has risen in recent 
years.3 As explained in this policy brief, the distorted interest 
rate structure poses an obstacle to further reform of the financial 
system and to sustaining China’s rapid economic growth.
Measuring Financial repression
Financial repression, defined here as the low and now negative 
real return on deposits, is most clearly evident from the point of 
view of households. One measure is the expanding differential 
between the nominal interest rate households receive on savings 
deposits and the rate of consumer price inflation. In February 
2002 the PBC fixed the maximum interest rate banks could 
pay on demand deposits at 0.72 percent, a rate that remains 
unchanged. But inflation, as measured by the consumer price 
index,  ticked  up  by  almost  9  percentage  points—from  –0.8 
percent in 2002 to .8 percent in 2007 and then to 8 percent in 
1. The Agricultural Bank of China, the one large state-owned bank that still 
has not been restructured, accounts for a very large share of these remaining 
nonperforming loans.
2. China Banking Regulatory Commission, 2007 Annual Report (Beijing, 2008), 
available at www.cbrc.gov.cn (accessed July 2, 2008).
3. While the PBC announces changes in benchmark lending and deposit rates, 
the State Council holds the ultimate authority to adjust rates.
. The central bank did raise the demand deposit rate briefly by 9 basis points to 
0.81 percent for five months in 2007, between July 21 and December 20.
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One of the principal dangers currently facing the world economy 
arises from the large and unsustainable imbalances in current 
account  positions.  Some  observers  argue  that  these  imbal-
ances will unwind gradually and nondisruptively, while others 
emphasize the risks of a sudden change of sentiment in financial 
markets that could result in an abrupt and damaging adjustment. 
No one knows which scenario will materialize, but a priority 
for policymakers should be to reduce the risks of a crisis, which 
could produce a world recession and disruptions to the global 
trading system. For that, the global economy requires official 
sponsorship of a credible, comprehensive adjustment program. 
This policy brief outlines such a program.
Section 1 presents why the current situation is unsustain-
able. Adjustment must take place and will require significant 
movements in exchange rates. Section 2 argues that adjustment 
induced by policy actions is more likely to be orderly than one 
initiated by financial markets. We view the current stalemate 
regarding policy actions as dangerous, as financial-market partic-
ipants are likely to change their minds at some stage about the 
sustainability of imbalances unless they see that the main players 
are able to agree on the direction of desirable policy changes. 
Section 3 presents estimates of the exchange rate implications 
of global current account adjustment from a variety of models. 
Section 4 describes the policy implications the authors of this 
brief drew from these results and the workshop discussions.
WHY THE CURRENT SITUATION 
IS UNSUSTAINABLE
There has been a great deal of discussion recently of global current 
account imbalances. Much of the attention has focused on the 
historically large US current account deficit, which, according to 
the US Bureau of Economic Analysis, reached $857 billion (6.5 
percent of GDP) in 2006. The counterpart to this deficit can be 
found mainly in Asia and the oil-exporting countries. Accord-
ing to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), China’s surplus 
swelled to an estimated $184 billion (7.2 percent of GDP) in 
2006,1 while Japan recorded an estimated surplus of $167 billion 
(3.7 percent of GDP) last year. High oil prices propelled the 
surplus for countries in the Middle East to $282 billion last 
year. 
1. This estimate appears conservative. China’s trade surplus in goods was $178 
billion in 2006, with imports reported on a cost, insurance, freight (c.i.f) basis. 
When the import data are adjusted to free on board (f.o.b.), the trade in goods 
surplus will likely come in at about $215 billion. Based on trends in the other 
items in the first-half balance of payments, Nicholas Lardy estimates that China’s 
surplus last year was $240 billion (see Nicholas Lardy,  Toward a Consumption-
Driven Growth Path, Policy Briefs in International Economics PB06-6, Washing-
ton: Peterson Institute for International Economics, October 2006).
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the first quarter of 2008. Thus the real rate of return on 
demand deposits went from 1.2 to –.08 percent and then 
to –7.28 percent. Since February 2002, the PBC has increased 
the rates banks are allowed to pay on term deposits but by 
far less than the increase in inflation. For example, the one-
year term deposit rate in the first quarter of 2008 was .1 
percent, an increase of 2.16 percentage points from the rate 
in February 2002. But that increase is less than a fourth of 
the increase in the pace of inflation over the same period and 
has converted a real return of 2.78 percent in 2002 into a real 
return of –3.86 percent in the first quarter of 2008. Simulta-
neously, lending rates have also been repressed, as reflected in 
the sharp decline in real lending rates over the same period 
(see below).
One measure of the implicit tax imposed on households 
by the decline in the real return on savings deposits is to esti-
mate how much higher household interest income would have 
been in the first quarter of 2008 if households had received the 
same real rate of interest on their net renminbi-denominated 
savings deposits as in 2002.6 Household deposits at the end 
of the first quarter of 2008 stood at RMB19.1 trillion while 
their  bank  borrowings  stood  at  RMB.3  trillion,  making 
their net deposits RMB13.8 trillion.7 The estimated implicit 
tax on these deposits is RMB2 billion ($36 billion), the 
equivalent of .1 percent of GDP, in the first quarter of 2008.8 
. National Bureau of Statistics of China, Overall Stability in National Eco-
nomic Circulation in the First Quarter (Beijing, April 16, 2008), www.stats.
gov.cn (accessed April 16, 2008).
6. Households and corporates also have foreign-currency deposits in banks 
and borrow foreign-currency funds. The entire analysis in this policy brief is of 
domestic currency–denominated deposits and loans but hereafter the phrase 
“renminbi-denominated” will not be repeated.
7. At the end of March 2008, the US dollar–renminbi exchange rate was 
1:7.019. To convert renminbi amounts from 2008Q1 to US dollars, divide the 
renminbi amount by 7.019. So, net deposits of RMB13.8 trillion divided by 
7.019 equals about $2 trillion.
8. Demand deposits accounted for 37 percent of all household deposits at the 
end of 2008Q1. For simplicity the calculation of the amount of additional 
interest households would have earned if real interest rates had remained 
unchanged is based on the assumption that all time deposits were one-year de-
posits. The term of time deposits is as short as three months and as long as five 
years. However, time deposits of two, three, and five years account for only  
to 7 percent of total household savings deposits. Most household time deposits 
This implicit tax is more than three times the proceeds from 
the only tax imposed directly on households—the personal 
income tax.9 
Who benefits from this large implicit tax on households? 
How is the largesse distributed among corporates, banks, and 
the government itself?
Corporates might be the major beneficiary of financial 
repression. The real interest rate on loans has plummeted since 
2002, and most loans go to corporates, not to households. In 
2002 the PBC pegged the benchmark nominal interest rate on 
a one-year loan at .31 percent and producer goods prices fell 
by 2.3 percent, making the real rate of interest for a corporate 
borrower 7.6 percent. By contrast, in the first quarter of 2008 
the benchmark nominal interest rate on one-year loans was 
7.7 percent, but producer price inflation was 7.9 percent, 
so the real interest rate was –0. percent. In short, corporate 
borrowers in the first quarter of 2008 faced an interest rate on 
one-year loans that was 8.1 percentage points less in real terms 
than in 2002! With corporate loans outstanding of RMB22.2 
trillion, the implicit subsidy to corporates would appear to 
be enormous, far more than the implicit tax on households. 
However, corporates are also large depositors in the banking 
system, and they face the same low real deposit rates as house-
holds. At the end of 2008Q1, nonfinancial corporate bank 
deposits stood at RMB19. trillion, so corporates were net 
borrowers of only RMB2.8 trillion. The net benefit in the first 
quarter of 2008 to corporates from financial repression was 
RMB billion, a little less than 1 percent of GDP and about 
a fifth of the net implicit tax on households.
If only a fifth of the implicit tax on households goes to 
corporates,  then  perhaps  banks  themselves  are  the  biggest 
beneficiary of financial repression. During 2007, for example, 
the PBC raised benchmark interest rates six times. But the 
central  bank  left  the  benchmark  rate  on  demand  deposits 
unchanged, except for a five-month interlude when it raised 
the rate by only 9 basis points. At the Industrial and Commer-
cial Bank of China (ICBC), China’s largest bank, demand 
deposits accounted for 3 percent of total deposits in 2007. 
The large share of demand deposits meant that even though 
the interest rate the bank had to pay on term deposits rose 
by as much as 171 basis points in 2007,10 the bank’s aver-
age cost of funds rose by only 12 basis points compared with 
are six-month or one-year deposits. Taking into account the term structure of 
interest rates on time deposits and the mix of these deposits, the one-year time 
deposit is an excellent proxy for all time deposits in this calculation. 
9. The personal income tax generated RMB319 billion in 2007, 1.3 percent 
of GDP.
10. The benchmark rate on five-year term deposits rose from .1 to .8 
percent.
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2006 (rising from 1.6 to 1.77 percent). On the other hand, 
because the PBC raised benchmark lending rates for loans of 
all maturities, the average yield on the ICBC’s loans went up 
69 basis points (from .2 to 6.11 percent). The spread on the 
bank’s deposit taking and lending business thus rose to 3 
basis points from 377 in 2006. With an average of RMB tril-
lion in loans outstanding in 2007, the increase in the spread 
accounted for 0 percent of the increase in ICBC’s net interest 
income in 2007.11 
But what the PBC grants to banks in the form of cheap 
deposits it partially or perhaps even largely rescinds through 
its  massive  sterilization  operations. To  initially  maintain  a 
fixed nominal exchange rate vis-à-vis the US dollar and since 
mid-200, when its new exchange rate policy was announced, 
to control the pace of renminbi appreciation, the government 
(acting through the central bank) has been forced to intervene 
massively in the foreign currency market. This intervention is 
partially reflected in the growth of official foreign exchange 
reserves, which rose by $1.6 trillion, from $212 billion at the 
end of 2002 to $1.8 trillion at the end of June 2008.12 To 
prevent the massive sales of domestic currency (i.e., purchases 
of foreign exchange) from leading to outsized increases in the 
domestic money supply, from 2002 through the end of June 
2008 the PBC increased the required reserve ratio of banks 21 
times, taking the rate from 6 to 17. percent. This compelled 
banks to place an additional RMB.2 trillion on deposit at the 
central bank.13 The other key instrument the central bank uses 
to sterilize increases in the domestic money supply is to sell 
large quantities of central bank bills to banks. At the end of 
June 2008 banks held RMB.2 trillion in central bank bills. 
Both types of sterilization impose a tax on banks because 
the nominal rate of interest banks receive on both reserves and 
11. Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, “2007 Annual Results An-
nouncement,” China Daily, March 26, 2008, 1–22.
12. Central bank intervention in the foreign exchange market substantially 
exceeded $1.6 trillion because the government redeployed some foreign 
exchange reserves to support other policy objectives during this period, thus 
reducing the quantity of reserves below the levels that would have otherwise 
been reported. Beginning in August 2007 the central bank has also required 
some banks to meet the increases in required reserves by placing foreign-cur-
rency rather than domestic-currency funds at the central bank, thus reducing 
the needed magnitude of central bank intervention in the interbank foreign 
exchange market. This requirement does not change the amount of foreign ex-
change held by the central bank but results in identifying part of it as liabilities 
to banks rather than official foreign exchange reserves.
13. Renminbi bank deposits at the end of June 2008 were RMB trillion. 
The calculated increase of RMB.2 trillion does not take into account that ur-
ban and rural credit cooperatives and rural cooperative banks, which account 
for 0.02 percent of deposits in the banking system, face a reserve requirement 
that is from 1 to 2½ percentage points below the general rate. Nor does it take 
into account that banks with capital adequacy less than the statutory rate face 
a penalty reserve ratio that is one-half percentage point higher than the general 
rate.
central bank bills is below the nominal interest rate that banks 
would receive if they loaned these funds to customers rather 
than handing them over to the central bank. For example, 
the PBC pays banks 1.89 percent on required reserves, a rate 
unchanged since it was first fixed in February 2002. That rate is 
well below the average 8.72 percent interest rate banks earned 
in March 2008 on loans of six months up to one year in term.1 
Similarly, central bank bills earn relatively low interest rates. 
For example, three-year bills sold at the end of June 2008 yield 
.6 percent, far less than the 7.7 percent benchmark interest 
rate on a three-year loan. The implicit tax imposed on banks in 
2007 through the requirement to hold additional low-yielding 
reserves and central bank bills is RMB230 billion.1 
But this implicit tax on banks is increasing in 2008 for two 
reasons. First, PBC intervention in the foreign exchange market 
is increasing, so the magnitude of sterilization the central bank 
must undertake in order to have any prospect for maintaining 
price stability has increased. Second, since 2007, the PBC has 
relied more on increases in the reserve ratio, and the implicit tax 
on banks associated with reserves is substantially greater than 
the implicit tax associated with holding central bank bills.16 
In the first half of 2008 alone the 3 percentage point increase 
in the reserve ratio meant banks had to deposit an additional 
RMB1.3 trillion with the PBC, causing the number of banks 
falling below the statutory 2 percent liquidity ratio to more 
than quadruple from 8 to 392 by the end of May. No surprise 
then that the CBRC has reportedly advised the State Council 
1. People’s Bank of China Monetary Policy Analysis Small Group, Report 
on Implementation of Monetary Policy in China in 2008Q1 (Beijing, May 1, 
2008, 8). www.pbc.gov.cn (accessed May 1, 2008).
1. Morris Goldstein and Nicholas Lardy, China’s Exchange Rate Policy: An 
Overview of Some Key Issues, in Debating China’s Exchange Rate Policy, ed. 
Morris Goldstein and Nicholas Lardy (Washington: Peterson Institute for 
International Economics, 2008), 6–7.
16. This is because over the course of 2007 the interest rate paid on central 
bank bills rose by 90, 126, and 1 basis points, respectively, on three-month, 
one-year, and three-year maturities. People’s Bank of China Monetary Policy 
Analysis Small Group, Report on Implementation of Monetary Policy in China in 
2007Q4 (Beijing, February 22, 2008, 8), www.pbc.gov.cn (accessed February 
22, 2008). On the other hand, as already noted, the central bank has left the 
interest rate it pays on required reserves unchanged since February 2002. 
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not to approve any further increase in the reserve ratio.17 
Contrary  to  the  initial  supposition,  the  analysis  above 
indicates that Chinese banks are not large net beneficiaries of 
financial repression. They gain from access to low-cost deposits 
but lose from the requirement to place funds into low-yielding 
reserves and central bank bills. In the first quarter of 2008 
banks appear to have “captured” about one-quarter of the net 
implicit tax imposed on households, an amount slightly larger 
than the gains to corporates.
These  calculations  mean  that  the  government  must 
be capturing slightly more than half of the implicit net tax 
imposed on households by financial repression. But how does 
the government gain from financial repression? In short, the 
government  gains  from  the  implicit  tax  it  imposes  on  the 
banks via the PBC’s sterilization operations. The cost to the 
government, and its agent the central bank, of maintaining 
an undervalued exchange rate is far less than it would be in a 
more liberalized interest rate environment. In a more liberal-
ized financial environment, the cost of sterilization would rise 
more over time, putting greater pressure on the authorities 
to allow the exchange rate to appreciate so as to reduce the 
external surplus, thus reducing both the needed amount of 
intervention in the foreign exchange market and the needed 
magnitude of sterilization operations. 
iMplications
Several implications follow. First, the financial repression that 
has emerged since roughly 2002 appears to be the consequence 
of  the  government’s  policy  of  maintaining  an  undervalued 
exchange rate. In the early years of this decade China’s current 
account  was  closer  to  being  in  balance—for  example,  the 
current account surplus in 2001 and 2002 averaged under 2 
percent of GDP; the build up of foreign exchange reserves and 
sterilization operations were both moderate; and interest rates 
and the required reserve ratio were not significantly distorted.
17. Ma Junqin, “Dangers in Further Increases in the Required Reserve Ratio,” 
July 18, 2008, http://big.xinhuanet.com (accessed July 31, 2008).
As noted earlier, real deposit and lending rates were both 
positive, and China’s 6 percent required reserve ratio was not an 
outlier compared with ratios imposed by most central banks. 
In the late 1990s and early part of this decade the PBC was 
liberalizing interest rates by allowing increased fluctuations 
from its established benchmarks. At the time, the government 
was continuing a fixed nominal exchange rate vis-à-vis the 
US dollar, a policy initially adopted in the mid-1990s. As the 
US dollar appreciated in the second half of the 1990s, the 
renminbi appreciated significantly on a trade-weighted basis, 
roughly offsetting domestic productivity growth, thus leading 
to modest annual current account surpluses. 
After February 2002, however, the US dollar began to 
depreciate steadily, leading to a significant real effective depre-
ciation of the renminbi as well. With a lag of a year or so, 
China’s current account surplus began to expand by about 2 
percentage points of GDP per year, reaching an all-time high 
of 11.3 percent of GDP in 2007. As already noted, maintain-
ing initially a fixed nominal exchange rate and after mid-200 
a relatively fixed exchange rate (the renminbi appreciated only 
about 1 percent on a trade-weighted basis between mid-200 
and mid-2008) in the face of a rapidly rising external surplus 
required increasing PBC intervention in the foreign exchange 
market and, to prevent runaway inflation, large-scale steriliza-
tion operations. 
Despite rising inflation, the government was reluctant to 
raise interest rates for fear of attracting even larger specula-
tive inflows, which would have compounded the challenge of 
controlling the pace of appreciation and the growth of monetary 
aggregates. The resulting decline in real interest rates as infla-
tion rose has reduced the cost of maintaining an undervalued 
exchange rate. And the PBC raised the required reserve ratio 
to a level unusually high compared with ratios established by 
other central banks. The central bank in the fourth quarter of 
200 also suspended its program of interest rate liberalization. 
In short, it is no accident the emergence of financial repres-
sion in China has coincided with the government’s policy of 
maintaining an increasingly undervalued currency. 
Second, the simultaneous granting of implicit subsidies to 
banks and imposing implicit taxes on banks makes it difficult 
to evaluate bank performance. Are the large increases in profits 
reported by most banks in 2007, for example, the result of 
improvements in corporate governance, business procedures, 
risk management, and staff training? Or are they due to the 
widening of spreads as a result of PBC control of benchmark 
interest rates? If the growth of bank profits in 2008 slows 
compared with that in prior years, does it reflect deteriorating 
risk management by banks or higher implicit taxes imposed by 
the PBC’s increased sterilization operations? Moreover, aren’t 
Financial repression reduces the cost to 
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arbitrary and unanticipated changes in these implicit subsidies 
and taxes so large that they undermine the incentive of top 
bank  managers  to  improve  the  underlying  performance  of 
their institutions? In short, while the central government has 
long articulated the goal of transforming banks to operate on 
commercial principles, financial repression is fundamentally 
inimical to achieving that goal.
Third, and related, financial repression has contributed to 
the expansion of underground finance (dixia jinrong). Accord-
ing to a study by Professor Li Jianzhun of Capital University 
of  Finance  and  Economics  (an  affiliate  of  the  Ministry  of 
Finance), by the end of June 2008 underground lending stood 
at RMB10 trillion, equivalent to almost a third of the loans 
extended through the banking system.18 The use of below-
market lending rates and quantitative controls on bank lend-
ing insures that there is a large demand for credit that banks 
do not meet. This drives would-be bank borrowers, particu-
larly less well connected small and medium-sized enterprises, 
to borrow in the underground financial market, where they 
pay  lending  rates  well  above  the  benchmark  lending  rates 
set by the PBC. Similarly, negative real deposit rates in the 
banking system provide a substantial incentive for savers to 
deposit funds in higher interest–paying accounts outside the 
formal banking system. The huge size of this entirely unregu-
lated market poses significant risks to China’s financial system 
and tends to undermine the ability of the central bank to use 
monetary policy as an instrument of macroeconomic manage-
ment.
Fourth, the increasing implicit tax that the government 
has  imposed  on  household  savings  has  seriously  distorted 
the structure of demand, in turn raising questions about the 
sustainability  of  rapid  economic  growth.  Chinese  Premier 
Wen Jiabao in his press conference immediately following the 
National People’s Congress in March 2007 said that “China’s 
economic  growth  is  unsteady,  unbalanced,  uncoordinated, 
and unsustainable.” Premier Wen’s critique was that growth 
had come to depend disproportionately on increasing invest-
18. “Irregular Credit Completely Offsets the Retrenchment Gap,” China 
Economic Management Report, July 6, 2008.
ment spending and a rising external surplus. Consumption 
as a share of GDP has fallen sharply, and its contribution to 
growth is now unusually low, in comparison with both other 
countries and the earlier reform period in China. As early 
as 200 the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee 
formally called for a rebalancing of the sources of economic 
growth, specifically for an increase in household consumption 
as a share of GDP. The Party has failed to achieve this goal. 
Since 200, the share of household consumption in GDP has 
continued to fall, cumulatively by almost  percentage points 
of GDP, to the astoundingly low level of only 3.3 percent of 
GDP in 2007. 
One important reason for the continued decline in the 
contribution of household consumption to China’s economic 
growth is that household income as a share of GDP is declin-
ing.  A  principal  reason  for  this  decline  is  that  household 
interest income as a share of GDP is falling, even though 
household savings as a share of GDP have risen. In short, as 
long as financial repression reduces the growth of household 
income below the path it would otherwise achieve, it is less 
likely that the government will reach the goal of rebalancing 
the sources of economic growth. Thus, as we are seeing in 
2008, China’s economy is vulnerable to a decline in external 
demand. The pace of growth in 2008 is likely to decline by 
about 2 full percentage points compared with 2007, as the 
prior  contribution  of  rising  external  demand  evaporates  as 
global  growth  slows  and  household  consumption  demand 
continues to languish, reduced below potential by financial 
repression. This initial growth slowdown should be welcomed, 
since China was growing above its long-term potential growth 
rate in 2007. But if the slowdown in global growth deepens 
and extends well into 2009, the further decline in external 
demand could slow China’s growth rate further, to a level the 
leadership regards as inadequate for sustaining job growth and 
social stability. 
Fifth, financial repression makes it less likely that China 
will  be  able  to  develop  a  fully  and  efficiently  functioning 
capital  market.  Financial  repression  works  largely  because 
household savers have few alternative financial assets to bank 
[Financial repression] has led to 
lending rates that are far too low, 
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deposits. Equities are an option, but it is hard not to believe 
that the extreme price volatility in the Chinese equity market 
in recent years is at least in part a response to the negative 
returns available on bank deposits. When the market begins 
to rise, as it did in the second half of 2006, there is a huge 
flood of money out of bank deposits into equities, driving 
prices to almost unheard of multiples, as had happened by the 
fall of 2007. Then some exogenous event sets off a correction, 
causing prices and multiples to collapse. By late July 2008 the 
Shanghai stock index had declined by more than 0 percent 
compared with its peak in mid-October 2007. 
Real assets, notably property, are another alternative to 
bank deposits for Chinese households. Part of the rapid run 
up in property prices in urban China in recent years must be 
due to the negative returns on bank deposits, which has led 
many households to buy multiple residential properties, with 
the attendant financial risk that such speculation entails. 
China’s bond market, although no longer small, is domi-
nated  by  government  paper  (treasury  bonds,  central  bank 
bills, and subordinated debt of state-owned or state-controlled 
banks), sold largely to banks and other financial institutions 
in which the government remains the sole owner or control-
ling  shareholder.  Outside  of  short-term  commercial  paper, 
corporate bond issuance is minuscule, accounting for only 7 
percent of all bonds issued in 2007. If the government wishes 
to maintain a significantly undervalued exchange rate, it will 
have to continue intervening in the foreign exchange market 
and sterilizing most of the resulting increase in the domestic 
money supply. Thus it will be less likely to allow the develop-
ment of a range of bonds and alternative financial assets with 
pricing determined in the market since the cheap funding of 
the central bank’s sterilization operations requires the ongoing 
large flow of household savings into the banking system.
conclusion
Financial  repression  reduces  the  cost  to  the  government 
of  sterilized  intervention  to  sustain  China’s  undervalued 
exchange  rate  relative  to  the  cost  it  would  face  if  interest 
rates were liberalized. But the financial repression that facili-
tates China’s undervalued exchange rate imposes substantial, 
if partially hidden, costs on China’s economy. It has led to 
lending rates that are far too low, resulting in excess demand 
for bank loans and increased use of quantitative targets to 
control credit growth. These have led both to a less efficient 
allocation of capital through the banking system and to a huge 
underground financial market, which add substantial risks to 
China’s economy. 
Financial repression is also inimical to the government’s 
long-term goal of developing a commercial banking system. 
It also has depressed the growth of household income, under-
mining the government’s goal of transitioning to a growth path 
that relies less on investment and net exports and more on 
domestic consumption. Finally, financial repression is a seri-
ous obstacle to the development of a robust capital market.
Explicit  recognition  of  these  hidden  costs  of  financial 
repression should be part of the debate on further reform of 
China’s financial and exchange rate system.
[Financial repression] has depressed 
the growth of household income, 
undermining the government’s goal 
of transitioning to a growth path that 
relies less on investment and net exports 
and more on domestic consumption.
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